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KING KONG, Carroll and Currie:  
Misconstruing Monstrously  
How We See Things by Means of Movies 
 
 
Works of art, as Nelson Goodman has suggested, may introduce us to worlds other than 
our own – to objects and events in other spaces and times, yet equally real.1 Semiotically 
stricken, Goodman could never quite bring himself to acknowledge that we perceive those 
other worlds or their inhabitants, and quite properly so in the opinion of most 
philosophers, for had he said so, his claim would have seemed even more absurd, and 
appreciation of absurdity is a cultivated taste. To contend, for example, that we see King 
Kong when watching the movie named after him, a commonplace of ordinary discourse, 
has seemed even more absurd to some philosophers than the suggestion of Wittgenstein 
with which it accords, namely that the ordinary uses of our languages are, philosophically 
speaking, perfectly in order. 
 
I shall offer here no defense of what Goodman might better have said had he not lost his 
nerve, for none, I think, need be given: that we see King Kong when watching the movie is 
as true as it is absurd, being an identity claim about what we see, and identity claims, 
when push comes to shove, cannot be countered without begging the question.2 Rather, I 
shall focus upon the counterclaims of two authors, Noël Carroll and Gregory Currie, who, 
having registered its absurdity, dismiss it forthwith as unworthy of consideration when 
discussing things cinematical, presuming wrongly that it must therefore be unwarranted. 
The consequences of their contempt, symptoms of a veritable mental block or 'cognitive 
illusion' comparable to the supposed error of the same name of which they wrongly 
accuse others, are remarkable to behold. 
 
I shall focus here upon two confusions. The first, explicit in Carroll, is to presume that to 
distinguish filmmaking from playmaking, painting or the writing of novels or poems, etc., 
is essentialist and therefore philosophically untenable. The second, common to both 
authors, is to presume that we cannot when viewing a movie be seeing what we 
commonly think that we are seeing (seeing a great ape climbing a tall building, for 
                                                     
1 Nelson Goodman, The Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1987). 
2 For arguments to this conclusion and others relevant to how things 'reappear' to us by 
means of photographs and movies, see the other essays encompassed within the 'Screenwriting 
1895-1905 Prelude – the Arrival of the Lumiére's Train' sub-section of the 'Evan Wm. Cameron 
Collection' of YorkSpace, the 'Institutional Repository' of the Library of York University. 
[https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/handle/10315/35753] 
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example, when watching KING KONG). As we shall see, the first flows naturally from the 
second, but first things first. 
 
 
Confusion 1 
 
Noël Carroll has denied recurringly that we may justifiably acknowledge 'media specific' 
differences between photography and filmmaking on the one hand, and drawing and 
painting on the other (or, for that matter, between screenwriting and the writing of plays, 
novels, poems or short stories, or between composing music for movies and for concert 
presentation), despite the intuitions to the contrary of every powerful maker of movies 
since the arrival of the Lumiére's train. Why has he so persistently disregarded the 
evidence of history and his own eyes and ears? Because, I suspect, he has failed to register 
the logical niceties needed to avoid an erroneous conclusion at which he arrived earlier – 
the presumption that distinguishing between them would entail essentialism and thus be 
philosophically untenable.  
 
When attacking "the re-presentational theory of the photographic and cinematic image", 
Carroll minces no words: any suggestion that the tools of photography and filmmaking 
might be "unique" or "distinct" is essentialist. 
 
From these quotations, it is possible to derive the key elements of the re-
presentational theory of the photographic and cinematic image. First, it is 
essentialist, claiming that the nature of photographs and cinematic shots is 
unique, distinct, that is, from drawings, paintings, etc..3 (p.37?) 
 
We could distinguish photographs and movies from drawings and paintings, Carroll 
insists, only if works of the former kind were to embody an 'essence' distinct from the 
'essence' embodied by works of the latter kind – only, that is, if photographs and movies 
were to 'share something in common' that no drawings or paintings share with one 
another, and conversely. Absent 'essences', we could never distinguish between them. 
                                                     
3 Noël Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), page 37. Readers would be well-advised to ponder the essays included within "Part 
I: Questioning Media", pages 1-74, all of which are designed to divert attention in one way or 
another from the usefulness of notions of 'specificity of media' with respect to the arts and in 
particular those of the 'uniqueness claims' for photographic and cinematographic 're-
presentation', as Carroll puts is. That the things that we see by means of photographs and 
movies are never 'present' to us as we see them, much less 'represented', but do 'appear' to us 
as we see them and are therefore 'reappearances' of things that stood before the camera when 
the photograph or movie, as Santayana insisted long ago, will be central to the second part of 
this presentation. (See footnote 2 above). 
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But this is misrepresent the logic of how we distinguish things from on another – to 
presume, that is, that we need talk of 'essences' to do so. 
 
As Wittgenstein confirmed late in life through an example of remarkable simplicity, to 
seek for essences in the things to which we refer by a common term is a waste of time. 
We can distinguish 'games' of different kinds from one another without presupposing 
anything common to them all.  
 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-
games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to 
them all? – Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be 
called 'games" but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if 
you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but 
similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't 
think, but look! … And this is just how one might explain to someone what a 
game is. One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. I 
do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that 
common thing which I for some reason was unable to express; but that he is 
now to employ those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples is not 
an indirect means of explaining in default of something better. For any general 
definition can be misunderstood. The point is that this is how we play the game. 
(I mean the language-game with the word "game".)4 
 
Wittgenstein's counsel to avoid wasting time searching for essences lay at the centre of 
his mid-life reconstrual of the methods and aims of philosophy, for as evident in the 
citation from Shakespeare's King Lear with which he once thought of opening his 
Philosophical Investigations', he wished above all to "teach us differences".5 If we are to 
discriminate more exactly between things, we must avoid groping for essences.  
                                                     
4 From Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, vis-à-vis translation by G. E. M. 
Anscombe, edited by Anscombe and Rush Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963 [1953]), sections 
66 and 71. Wittgenstein spoke of games rather than cats, dogs or chocolate bars, or 
photographs, movies, drawings or paintings, but the import of his example is ubiquitous. 
5 See G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein, Understanding and Meaning, Vol. 1 
of 'an analytical commentary on the Philosophical Investigations' (Chicago, Illinois: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980), page 18. The admonition "I shall teach you differences" is uttered by Kent 
to Oswald, the miscreant servant of Goneril, in Act 1, Scene IV of the play. Remarkably, the 
authors open Volume 1 of their extensive commentary by insisting that "the quotation is 
nowhere to be found in Shakespeare's works", then citing three related sentences from the 
same scene! How one could read the play, locate the scene and find within it three close 
neighbors to the quotation, but miss the quotation itself, passes understanding to me – unless, 
of course, one were cynical enough to suppose that the authors had never bothered to read the 
play at all but had relied instead on either a cheap concordance or the misreport of a graduate 
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Carroll, however, unlike Wittgenstein, has never registered the platonic perversity of 
presuming that differences require essences.6 Unsurprisingly, therefore, he has never 
pondered how filmmakers have learned from the 'media specific' differences between 
filmmaking and other arts, disregarding the history of problem-solving by filmmakers 
working hard to distinguish what they could do well with the tools of filmmaking from 
what could only be done well with other tools within other arts, misconstruing their 
efforts as a matter of 'stylistic' choice. We may dismiss as irrelevant the historical witness 
of the filmmakers themselves, Carroll thinks, however distinctive the tools of filmmaking 
may have seemed to them.  
 
But this is to dismiss the history of filmmaking itself, for learning how best to use one's 
tools rather than others lies at the centre of the crafts upon which filmmaking relies. Every 
filmmaker of elegance and power, having come to filmmaking accustomed to using the 
tools of another art, has had to learn how to distinguish new tools from the old, and as 
the tools evolved, it was exactly the growing awareness among filmmakers of the 
differences between them and those of other arts that propelled the 'stylistic' changes so 
dear to Carroll's heart.  
 
To presume otherwise is to underestimate what filmmakers were compelled to learn of 
the differences between filmmaking and playmaking, for example, before doing what they 
did, and how hard it was to do it. Examples abound. 
 
Every filmmaker with eyes and ears coming to realize during the 1930s that 
'background music', destructive of staged dramas at their most serious moments, 
could be used ubiquitously within most serious films;  
 
Sternberg learning that lighting faces for film differs from lighting faces for 
photographs or theatre;  
 
Riskin, with Capra, recognising that the leading character of a serious film, being a 
'reactor' rather than an 'actor' (the distinction later articulated by Dudley Nichols, 
                                                     
student. In any case, this is assuredly one of the rare examples in the literature of philosophy in 
which the initial remark of a major commentary is trivially mistaken.. 
6 For an account of Wittgenstein's learning of the lesson, see "From Plato to Socrates: 
Wittgenstein's Journey on Collingwood's Map" within the 'Philosophical Enquiries' sub-section 
of the 'Evan Wm. Cameron Collection' of YorkSpace, the 'Institutional Repository' of the Library 
of York University. [https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/handle/10315/35702.] Carroll's 
failure here and elsewhere to register the importance of the work of the later Wittgenstein 
remains, for me, one of the wonders of contemporary philosophy.  
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John Ford's screenwriter), could, contra theatrical practice, respond to an event 
both seriously and humorously;  
 
Welles, having sorted the wheat from the chaff within the "catalogue of effects" of 
CITIZEN KANE, concluding correctly thereafter that visual lapse dissolves, unlike 
the auditory mixes to which he was accustomed in radio and theatre, are 
dramatically destructive in film;  
 
Olivier coming to recognize that he could not present himself to us by means of 
film, as he had been accustomed to doing in the theatre, when delivering the 
soliloquies of HAMLET; or  
 
Zeffirelli, when confronted with the task of adapting Verdi's LA TRAVIATA to film, 
dwelling on anything but the face of the singer singing an aria, contrary to operatic 
practice, and for good reason.7 
 
What misled Carroll into dismissing the obvious importance to filmmakers of the 'media 
specific' differences between filmmaking and other arts and therewith the core of its 
history as irrelevant to our understanding of it? A misconception, I think, of how we see 
things appearing to us by means of movies that has seemed to him, and to Gregory Currie 
as well, so unexceptional (may I say 'essential'?) that the alternative, as true as it is 
absurd, has seemed unworthy of consideration. But that brings me to the second 
confusion. 
 
 
Confusion 2 
 
I enter a cinema in Toronto in the 1990s to catch a screening of KING KONG. As the film 
unfolds, I and everyone else in the audience see the great ape climbing a building in a city 
far from Toronto in the 1930s, and we respond with fascination to what we are seeing. 
That is how we describe what we have seen when it with one another afterwards, 
speaking as viewers have spoken of things seen by means of movies films since 1895, how 
every filmmaker of power known to me has described what viewers would be seeing by 
means of their films when, hard at work constructing them, they have discussed their 
options with others and how every viable critic has reported the happenings within films 
they have seen – every critic, that is, having outgrown what Hume or Wittgenstein would 
rightly have regarded as a momentary fit of 'philosophical' perplexity. 
                                                     
7 For fuller accounts of these achievements, see the relevant essays under the 'Subjects' 
of the 'Evan Wm. Cameron Collection' of YorkSpace, the 'Institutional Repository' of the Library 
of York University. [https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/handle/10315/3520]2 
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Listen to Carroll, however, commenting on our supposed behaviour when encountering 
horrifying things by means of movies. 
 
... if one really believed that the theatre was beset by lethal shape changers, 
demons, intergalactic cannibals, or toxic zombies, one would hardly sit by for 
long. One would probably attempt to flee, to hide, to protect oneself, or to 
contact the proper authorities (the police, NASA, the bishop, the United 
Nations, the Department of Sanitation). People, that is, just don't behave as 
though they really believed there were monsters in the vicinity when they 
consume horror spectacles. Postulating this kind of belief may exonerate them 
from charges of inconsistency, but at the expense of making their behaviour 
inexplicably complacent, if not downright self-destructive and dumb.8 
 
... if when reading or viewing fictions we came to be convinced, albeit by 
deception, that werewolves really existed in our vicinity, it would be difficult to 
continue to savour the story. One would want to take some measures to secure 
one's life and love ones. A very condition of there being an institution of fiction 
from which we derive entertainment and pleasure is that we know that the 
persons and events are not actual. Obviously, in the case of horror, we could not 
be secure in our enjoyment of the spectacle if we believed in its reality. ... 
horror would [then] be too unnerving for all save heroes, consummate 
masochists, and professional vampire killers.9 
 
Or ponder Currie, echoing Kendall Walton, as he describes our supposed responses to 
seeing monstrous beings by means of movies. 
 
... film viewers simply do not react in the way that people would react who 
believed in the reality of the fictional events the film depicts. You have only to 
reflect for a moment on how you would react if you saw, or thought you saw, a 
threatening monster, or if you thought yourself alone in a house with an axe 
murderer, or if you thought you were watching someone about to be attacked 
by an axe murderer, to see that your behaviour in the cinema is quite unlike 
that of someone who really did believe in the reality of the fiction presented. ... 
If I even vaguely suspected that there was a monster on the loose I would leave 
the theatre immediately and call the police.10 
                                                     
8 Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror: or Paradoxes of the Heart (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), page 63. 
9 Ibid., page 64.  
10 Gregory Currie, Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pages 24, 26 and 27. Currie's discussion of Walton's 
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To Carroll and Currie, we could never be seeing King Kong, a great and angry ape, while 
sitting in a cinema and viewing the movie bearing his name, for were we to be seeing the 
monster, we should be acting differently than we do, rushing terrified about the cinema 
trying to escape the ape we see. 
 
But this misdescribes both what we see and our responses to it, and patently so, 
for, on the contrary, it would irrational beyond measure for me or anyone else, 
seated in a cinema in Toronto in the 1990s, to react in terror to seeing a great ape 
climbing a building far from Toronto in the 1930s! 
 
When watching KING KONG, we see no great ape romping about within the space and 
time within which we sit but rather see him climbing a building in a space and at a time 
different from our own. We identify the ape with nothing in the room within which we sit. 
By attending to the variably illuminated screen upon which the movie is being projected, 
we see an ape climbing a building within a space and time other than our own, and having 
encountered nothing terrifying within our own space and time, we behave as reasonable 
people would behave and would expect us to behave. We are indeed enabled by focusing 
upon the screen to see a great ape, but the relation is one of causality rather than 
identity, for we never identify the great ape with any part of the screen despite our seeing 
the one by seeing the other. 
 
Carroll and Currie have misdescribed how we see monsters by means of movies, but 
monsters are only one among many kinds of 'fictional characters' that movies enable us to 
see. As Currie soon confirms, the confusion that he shares with Carroll with respect to 
how we encounter monsters by means of movies undermines their accounts of how we 
thereby encounter other kinds of 'fictional characters' as well. 
  
In 1984 Kendall Walton published an article within which he articulated what soon came 
to be known as the 'transparency thesis' – the claim that photographs and movies 
'present' rather than symbolise things that stood before the cameras as they were being 
photographed.11 To Currie, Walton's contention, wrong though comprehensible when 
restricted to our seeing of such 'non-fictional' things, becomes patently absurd when 
extended to encompass 'fictional characters' such as Alicia Huberman or T. R. Devlin in 
NOTORIOUS. Currie can hardly cloak his disdain for those who would claim to be seeing by 
means of the movie the 'fictional characters' that the actors are portraying. 
                                                     
'Transparency Thesis' (see footnote 11) begins on page 50, but this and other contentions of 
Walton are often discussed by Currie throughout his book.  
11 Kendall Walton, "Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism", 
Critical Inquiry, No. 11 (1984), pages 246-277. 
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The claim that cinematography presents rather than represents the world must 
be understood as the claim that it presents the real world of actors, props, sets 
and locations, not the unreal world of fictional characters. If the thesis is right 
[Currie thinks it is wrong!], film presents us with Ingrid Bergman and Cary Grant, 
not with the characters they play in the movie, for these characters do not exist. 
Photography may have special powers, but it does not have the power to turn 
nonbeing into being.12 
 
But were viewers of NOTORIOUS unable to see Alicia Huberman as they watch Ingrid 
Bergman portraying her ('you can't have one without the other'), they could hardly 
while watching register rightly the bifold identity of what they are seeing – as viewers 
often and seamlessly do.13 A viewer unfamiliar but impressed with the actor might well 
whisper to a friend, 'Who's playing Alicia?, noting with a nod the reply, 'Ingrid Bergman', 
the friends having with perfect cogency identified the actor and the character that she is 
portraying. Were they unable to see the 'fictional character' being portrayed by the 
'non-fictional actor' portraying her, the question and answer would be nonsensical. 
 
Why have Carroll and Currie gone out of their way to misdescribe how we see things by 
means of movies, fictional or otherwise, disregarding as irrelevant how we and the 
makers of the movies commonly speak of them? Because, or so they think, they are 
doing us a favour. Whereas unsophisticated viewers talk as if they could see things by 
means of movies occurring in spaces and times other than their own, Carroll and Currie 
'know better'. Having presumed that we cannot by means of movies see things other than 
objects and events in our own space and time and eager to press onward to work on 
kindred subjects that would be rendered otiose were the presumption false, they 
misdescribe what anyone – themselves included! – would in common parlance claim to 
have seen by means of a movie, and then, in the hope of 'saving the appearances' they 
have misdescribed, they stack, like Ptolemy, epicycle upon epicycle of purported 
                                                     
12 Ibid., page 48. 
13 As Allardyce Nicoll had insisted sixty years before when contrasting 'Film & Theatre', 
to see an actor portraying a character by means of a movie is to see at one and the same time 
the character being portrayed. "We cannot appreciate burlesque in the cinema because of the 
fact that in serious films actor and rôle and indistinguishable; on the stage we can appreciate it 
since there, in serious plays, we can never escape from separating the fictional character and its 
creator." (Allardyce Nicoll, Film & Theatre (New York, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 
1936), page 36.) I comment at length upon Nicoll's insight in essays encompassed within the 
'Screenwriting, 1940-1960 – Uncoupling Movies from Novels, Plays, Poems & Stories' sub-
section of the 'Evan Wm. Cameron Collection' of YorkSpace, the 'Institutional Repository' of the 
Library of York University. [https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/handle/10315/35758] 
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explanation of 'whatever else', they think, we must rather have been seeing – whatever 
kind of misleading 'symbol', that is, they think it must have been. 
 
 
The Pretense of 'Symbols' 
 
When watching KING KONG in a cinema in Toronto in the 1990s, I and everyone else in 
the audience see a great ape climbing a building in a city far from Toronto at some time 
other than our own. To Carroll and Currie, however, contra Austin and Wittgenstein, our 
common description of what we have seen must be rejected. We can never, they 
presuppose, see anything occurring in a space and at a time other than our own. Though 
pretending to a new 'naturalism', neither can quite bring themselves to absorb the 
evidence that even the birds and the beasts of the field see and recognize objects by 
means of photographs and films. 
 
Carroll, for example, upon noting that we learn how to see things by means of 
photographs and movies simply by learning how to see things and that even pigeons can 
recognize trucks when confronted by photographs of them, refuses nevertheless to 
acknowledge that we and the pigeons acquire both skills at the same time and by the 
same means because the tasks are identical.14 For Carroll and for Currie as well, the things 
that we see by means of movies must rather be some kind of extraordinary 'symbols' for 
them – symbols that we have astonishingly learned to recognise simply by having learned 
to recognize the things themselves, just as pigeons, though unable to recognize 'symbols' 
of other kinds without extensive training, have inexplicably learned by simply seeing other 
things to recognize the referents of these symbols!'.  
 
Currie, for example, concludes his discussion of how he thinks we must be encountering 
'fictional characters or events' by means of movies with a concise summary of its import – 
a consequence that he generalises elsewhere to encompass how we must encounter 
every kind of thing be means of movies, fictional or otherwise. 
  
I sum up. At the movies, we do not see, nor do we imagine that we see, fictional 
characters or events. Rather, we see signs: pictorial or 'iconic' signs that tell us 
what to imagine."15 
 
To think so, however, is to impose a vacuous explanation upon a misdescription of how 
things appear to us by means of movies, 'fictional things and events' in particular but 'non-
                                                     
14 Noël Carroll, "Film, Attention, and Communication", in The Great Idea Today: 1996 
(Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Incorporated, 1966), page 13. 
15 Currie, op. cit., page 196. 
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fictional' ones as well, a begging of the question of cinematic perception masquerading as 
philosophical common sense. Much as the sense-data theorists of bygone days 
compounded rather than reduced the puzzle of perception by invoking spurious entities 
('sense-data') through which to explain our seeing of chairs and tables but that could only 
be identified by speaking of the chairs and tables themselves, so Carroll, Currie and the 
'new cognitivists' muddy how marvellously we see things by means of movies by invoking 
"iconic signs" that could only be identified by speaking of the things supposedly never 
seen by means of them. (When viewing KING KONG, so they say, we see only an "iconic 
sign" of the 'great ape'. What 'great ape'? The one that we mistakenly think that we are 
seeing!) 
  
The two confusions to which we have been attending are therefore interlinked, having 
confounded Carroll and Currie as they did Munsterberg in 1916.16 To avoid them, we must 
when watching movies, as when playing games or distinguishing cats from dogs, "look and 
see", as Wittgenstein insisted, building ever after upon the consequences of what we 
have seen, for, logically speaking, one can determine more accurately how something is 
seen only after having identified it.17 We must begin, that is, by acknowledging that we 
can see King Kong, Alicia Huberman, Ingrid Bergman and the other things that we 
commonly speak of seeing by means of movies, for to do otherwise is to attend to an 
ersatz encounter through causal prejudice and logical ineptitude. 
 
I make no attempt here or elsewhere to justify the unjustifiable presumption that I and 
others can see great apes, characters, actors or other objects by means of movies, and 
purposely so, for I should by doing so waste your time and my own, as would a physicist 
were she to try to try to justify her seeing of the counters on her instruments when 
describing the results of an experiment to colleagues. As Popper insisted half-a-century 
ago, science rests upon unjustified decisions. What distinguishes science from pseudo-
science is the level at which they occur. Unjustified decisions are warranted within science 
only with respect to basic observations – the level of 'looking and seeing' at counters on 
instruments, for example – never with respect to theories being tested. Enquiries into 
filmmaking must be comparably constrained. If we are to comprehend how see things by 
means of movies, we must build upon the consensus of viewers and filmmakers as they 
commonly speak of it – the level of 'looking and seeing' that Carroll and Currie, after 
Münsterberg, failed to respect. 
 
                                                     
16 Münsterberg suggested in 1916 that we see by means of movies a "mixture of fact 
and symbol" (see Hugo Münsterberg, The Photoplay: a Psychological Study (New York, New 
York: D. Appleton, 1916), page 71. Eighty years later, the phrase has morphed by Peircean 
evasion into "iconic signs", the title of section 6.9 of Currie's book, op. cit., pages 196 and 197. 
17 See footnote 2 above. 
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To reinforce the lesson in historical context, let me turn to the striking resonance between 
the pretenses of the 'new cognitivists' with respect to filmmaking and those of the 'logical 
positivists' before them with respect to the making of mathematics and physics, both 
striving to emulate practices known to them only by hearsay, having never worked within 
the disciplines of which they speak and thus having neither habits of use to constrain their 
conjectures nor respect for those of others who do – believing themselves nonetheless to 
be models of emulation. 
 
 
The Old and the New18 
  
In 1959, Alfred Ayer, the foremost English advocate of logical positivism, published an 
anthology of essays by the bright, energetic and argumentative men who had earlier this 
century committed themselves to reconstructing philosophy uncontaminated by 
metaphysics, emulating the latest exact science on the block, mathematical logic.19 
 
Ayer's anthology, Logical Positivism, is now of interest only to historians, for in the same 
year appeared the English translation of Karl Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 
preceded a year earlier by Norwood Hanson's Patterns of Discovery, and followed three 
years later by Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The three authors, 
despite differences, demolished the pretensions of positivism: no literate philosopher 
would ever again suggest that philosophy, or anything else, could be reconstructed 
without metaphysical presuppositions, much less scientifically, for every science, as David 
Park, the quantum physicist, was to remark of his own, "swims in metaphysics like a fish 
swims in water, supported by it on all sides but unconscious of its existence until 
something goes wrong".20 
 
                                                     
18 I have interwoven within the following three  pages remarks from my review in 1997 
of the anthology Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, edited by David Bordwell and Noël 
Carroll (Madison, Wisconsin: the University of Wisconsin Press, 1996) published within 
Philosophy & Literature 21, No. 2 (October, 1997, pages 492-494). [See https://muse. 
jhu.edu/issue/ 1568 and https://muse.jhu.edu/article/26877/summary ] 
19 'Logical Positivism' arose from the discussions of the members of the Vienna Circle, 
organised and sustained by Moritz Schlick in 1924 and lasting until in 1936 when he was 
murdered on a staircase leading to the philosophy rooms of the University of Vienna by a 
deranged student. After World War II a number of them emigrated to the United States where 
the movement centred and earned its name. 
20 I apologise to readers and to David Park for having no citation for this quotation. 
Professor Park was an esteemed colleague of mine at Washington State University, but I seem 
to have lost my record of the publication within which it appeared.     
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In 1997, forty years later, I was reminded of Ayer's anthology and of the promise, 
pretence and passing of 'logical positivism' by attending to a collection of essays, edited 
by David Bordwell and Noël Carroll and encompassing a contribution by Gregory Currie.21 
The volume was intended by its editors and contributors to serve as a model for film 
scholars of how to "reconstruct film studies".  
 
The anthology reaffirmed for me, however, the remarkable resonance between the 
pretences of the 'new cognitivists' and those of the 'logical positivists' before them, for 
just as the positivists sought to exclude metaphysics from philosophy by reconstructing it 
to look scientific, the 'new cognitivists' refuse to acknowledge any general approach to 
comprehending the problem-solving enterprise of filmmaking, foreswearing in particular 
any Freudian access to it, relying instead upon some kind of piecemeal, inductive 
procedural "stance" enabling anyone, it seems, regardless of their inexperience and 
incompetence as filmmakers, to bring empirical evidence of any kind to bear upon 
questions of any kind in film studies, be they historical, perceptual or analytical, 
unsupported by any "Grand Theory", much less metaphysical commitments. 
 
On the surface, Bordwell and Carroll differed in their summaries of this "stance". Bordwell 
speaking as bluntly as the positivists a half-century before him, insisted that film studies 
"need carry no determining philosophical assumptions about subjectivity or culture, no 
univocal metaphysical or epistemological or political presumptions … in short, no 
commitment to Grand Theory".22 Carroll, better acquainted with the issues and 
acknowledging that such presumptions are unavoidable, suggested nevertheless that it 
would be useless to strive to uncover them, for, having confused distinctiveness with 
essentialism, he was unable to fathom how the search could be viable.23 The method of 
film studies must rather be "dialectical", demolishing previous arguments with better 
ones.24  
 
Dialectical attack, of course, had been the method of the logical positivists (though they 
would never had called it so!), for, when push came to shove, they had no choice. Though 
they spoke incessantly of philosophy, science and mathematics and how to do them 
better, none of them had trained themselves to be able to do first-rate work in any of the 
disciplines of which they spoke. Even as they amplified superficial differences between 
themselves and their supposedly 'metaphysical' antagonists, the positivists were losing 
the war that they thought they were winning and for good reason.  
 
                                                     
21 See the anthology cited in footnote 18. 
22 Ibid., page 29. 
23 Ibid., pages 39 and 58. 
24 Ibid., pages xiv and 56f. 
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Neither they nor their antagonists had immersed themselves within any of the 
disciplines of which they spoke – philosophy included!  
 
None could contribute constructively to their advancement, much less by 
constructing useful 'theories''.  
 
Entrapped unwittingly within the 'metaphysical' presumptions of the day, none 
could recognize the nature and value of the contributions of others before them. 
 
Despite having never learned through the hard work of experimenting how to register the 
world more exactly before trying to explain it, the 'logical positivists' tried to impose their 
conjectures upon philosophy, mathematics and the sciences they pretended to know, 
misrepresenting all of them. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
What prevented Carrol and Currie from describing accurately how monsters appear to us 
by means of movies? What has prevented them and other 'new cognitivists' from 
respecting how viewers have spoken of the things that we see by means of movies? What 
in particular has prevented them from registering and building upon how filmmakers have 
thought and spoken of the things with which they hoped viewers would engage upon 
seeing them by means of the movies upon which they were working? Three questions 
requiring only a single answer: a lack of hands-on experience in putting the tools of 
filmmaking to use – a deficiency of comparable kind to that which before them had 
prevented the 'logical positivists' from comprehending philosophy, mathematics and 
science.   
 
No one among the 'new cognitivists' has bothered to learn how to make films 
before babbling about it, unaware save by hearsay of the scope and nature of the 
problems of 'filmmaking' that have determined its history. 
 
Were one to try to write a book on piano-playing without ever having learned to play the 
instrument competently, much less to play it 'musically' (as my wife would put it), one 
would fail to the surprise of no one. The 'new cognitivists' chatter on, however, striving to 
persuade listeners of speculations about filmmaking while misdescribing the very act of 
seeing upon which the making of powerful films rests. 
 
If, with them, we fail to respect how we commonly speak of seeing things by means of 
movies, refusing to acknowledge its precision and therewith the importance of the 
'media-specific' distinctions that our finest filmmakers have in practice been compelled to 
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draw when making them, we shall continue to tread water within the same swamp that 
entrapped Munsterberg in 1916.25 Unlike Munsterberg. however, we shall have no excuse 
for having rejected the refined presentiment common to our most penetrating 
philosophers from Socrates through Kant to Austin and Wittgenstein, namely that the 
purpose of seeking philosophical clarity is to focus more clearly upon the mystery of how 
the world appears to us – a conviction so important to the author of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, for example, that only the 'illogical positivists' could have dismissed it. 
 
As Oscar Wilde observed long after Kant,  
 
It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances. The true mystery of 
the world is the visible, not the invisible.26  
 
If the mystery of life lies in how things appear to us, then our seeing of things by means of 
photographs and movies is only a most example of how mysteriously things may appear 
to us, and Stanley Cavell, contra Carroll and Currie, was right to remind us of it and of our 
obligation as philosophers to accept rather than deny it. 
 
It may be felt that I make too great a mystery of these objects. My feeling is 
rather that we have forgotten how mysterious these things are, and in general 
how different things are from one another, as though we had forgotten how to 
value them. This is in fact something movies teach us.27 
 
To deny how we see things by means of movies to avert our gaze pretentiously from the 
ever-receding target at which philosophy must aim. Indeed, as the biologist J. B. S. 
Haldane reminded us,  
 
The universe may not only be stranger than we suppose, but stranger than we 
can suppose.28 
 
                                                     
25 See footnote 16 above. 
26 From "The Picture of Dorian Grey", quoted by Bas. C. Van Fraassen in The Scientific 
Image (Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1980), page 204. 
27 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Cinema (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1971), page 19.  
28 J. B. S. Haldane, as quoted in Science News (26 August 1978, Vol. 114, #9), page 136. 
